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Trustee Board Diversity, Governance Mechanisms, Capital Structure and Performance in UK 
Charities 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: We investigate the association among trustee board diversity (TBD), corporate governance (CG), 
capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) using a sample of UK charities. Specifically, we 
investigate the effect of TBD on CS, and ascertain whether CG quality moderates the TBD-CS nexus. 
Additionally, we examine the impact of CS on FP, and ascertain whether the CS-FP nexus is also moderated 
by TBD and CG quality.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: We employ a number of multivariate regression techniques, including 
ordinary least squares, fixed-effects, lagged-effects and two-stage least squares to rigorously analyse the data 
and test the hypotheses.  
Findings: First, we find that trustee board gender diversity has a negative effect on CS, but this relationship 
holds only up to the point of having three women trustees. We find similar, but relatively weak results for the 
presence of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic trustees. Second, we find that the TBD-CS nexus depends on 
the quality of CG with the relationship being stronger in charities with higher frequency of meetings, 
independent CG committee, and larger trustee and audit firm size. Third, we find that CS structure has a 
positive effect on FP, but this is moderated by TBD and CG quality. Our evidence is robust to different 
econometric models that adjust for alternative measures and endogeneities. We interpret our findings within 
the explanations of a theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories. 
 
Originality/value: Existing studies on TBD, CG, CS and FP in charities are rare. Our study distinctively 
attempts to address this empirical lacuna within the extant literature by providing four new insights with 
specific focus on UK charities. First, we provide new evidence on the relationship between TBD and CS. 
Second, we offer new evidence on the moderating effect of CG on the TBD-CS nexus. Third, we provide new 
evidence on the effect of CS on FP.  Finally, we offer new evidence on the moderating effect of TBD and CG 
on the CS-FP nexus. 
 
Keywords: Trustee board diversity, women and ethnic minority trustees, governance mechanisms, capital 
structure and performance, charities, UK 
 
Paper Type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the relationship among trustee diversity (TBD), corporate governance (CG), 
capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with 
specific focus on a sample of UK charities. The non-profit sector is economically vital worldwide. In the UK 
as at 31 March 2017, the number of charities registered was 165,277 with a total yearly income of £70.93bn 
and creating over a million jobs (Charity Commission, 2017). Charities in the UK also continue to receive a 
large amount of donations and grants from the general public/central government to support their services, 
despite severe public sector budget cuts following the recent global financial crisis. Thus, failure of charities 
can lead to significant reputational damage to the sector in particular, but the UK economy in general (Boateng 
et al., 2016). For example, it emerged that “Kids Company”, a large UK charity that collapsed recently, 
received £3 million UK government grant following a ministerial direction despite advice that the grant was 
unlikely to represent value for money for UK tax-payers only in the few weeks preceding its failure, and in 
total, this charity received over £100m of UK tax-payers’ funds. Additionally, charities in general are important 
as they provide a wide range of services to the local and international community, including providing services 
to children and their families, residential housing for the homeless, and free services to victims of earthquakes 
and wars. In spite of the importance of charities to local and the international community, CG structures in the 
charity sector are often overlooked, leading to poor accountability and CG, weak financial management and 
internal controls, and lack of adequate transparency (Newton, 2015). The weak monitoring and internal 
controls usually associated with charities has often led to their ultimate collapse, and the recent collapse of the 
“Kids Company” in the UK is a classic example. The UK Public Accounts Committee’s report into the failure 
of this charity indicates that its insolvency was mainly caused by poor CG, CS and FP practices (PACAC, 
2016). 
One way to strengthen CG quality in charities is to ensure that more trustees of women and ethnic minority 
backgrounds are appointed to charity boards (Buse et al., 2016; Das & Dey, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 
2015). Indeed, recent global debate and public policy, especially in the EU, UK and Scandinavian countries 
has sought to affirmatively increase diversity in corporate boards. It is argued that board gender and ethnic 
diversity can enhance managerial monitoring and board independence by bringing diverse ideas, perspectives 
and knowledge into board decision-making (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Delis et al., 
2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2015; Triana et 
al., 2013). The increased monitoring and independence often associated with diverse boards may enhance 
legitimacy and trustworthiness of the board, and consequently encourage stakeholders to provide support to 
charities, including finance (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Perrault, 2015; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). It is generally 
accepted that board diversity, CG, CS and FP are interlinked with researchers suggesting that boardroom 
diversity has a significant impact on critical corporate decisions, including CG and CS choices (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2005). However, there seems to be a lack of empirical evidence relating to the impact of board gender 
and ethnic diversity on CS, and the influence of CS on FP in charities. Therefore, in this paper, we seek to 
make a number of new contributions to prior studies by examining the link among trustee board (i.e., gender 
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and ethnic) diversity (TBD), CG, CS and FP using a sample of UK charities. Specifically, we investigate the 
extent to which TBD drives CS, and ascertain whether CG quality moderates the link between TBD and CS. 
In addition, we examine the effect of charity CS on FP, and ascertain whether the charity CS-FP nexus is also 
contingent on the quality of CG. A theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS 
theories informs our analysis.  
Theoretically, agency theory (loosely incorporating signalling and perking order predictions) suggests that 
there is often a potential conflict of interest (and related agency costs) between the motives of principals (i.e., 
stakeholders, for example, donors) and agents (i.e., enterprise management, for example charity trustees) 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Jensen (1986), 
substantial free cash flows in enterprises, such as charities could signal agency problems (costs) to principals 
because of the risk of cash misappropriation by charity trustees. To signal efficiency in the use of cash flows, 
Jensen (1986) suggests that charities can use debt financing as a useful CG mechanism to reduce such agency 
conflicts. This is because debt financing would effectively bond the trustees (a signal of agents’ commitment) 
to operate efficiently in order to be able to pay the interest and the debt (i.e. future cash flows). Consequently, 
the use of high levels of debt may result in reducing agency costs often associated with having more free cash 
flows in the hands of trustees. In the same way, Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jiraporn, Kim, Kim and 
Kitsabunnarat (2012) suggest that the use debt may incentivise managers (trustees) to work harder, reduce 
misappropriation of resources, and make better investment decisions. Therefore, one way by which charities 
can reduce such agency conflict (e.g. the potential for misappropriation of excessive free cash flows in the 
hands of charity trustees) is by using debt financing. 
Second, legitimacy theory indicates that charities gain their right to exist from the broader society. 
Consequently, the goals, norms and aspirations of charities should be aligned with those of the broader society 
(Patten, 1991) in order to attract funds (i.e., donations and government grants) (Deegan, 2002). Third, 
stakeholder theory identifies specific powerful stakeholders within the larger society that a charity may need 
to be accountable to in order to legitimise its operations and gain access to resources (Gray et al., 1995). Finally, 
resource dependence theory suggests that directors (trustees) can influence CS through their 
networks/connections with the providers of finance (Tricker, 2012). Specifically, and in relation to TBD, the 
presence of women and ethnic minority trustees on a charity’s board may help in optimising CS and enhancing 
FP by providing a broader network of external donors (Singh, 2007). 
Given the varied theoretical reasons underlying the relationship among CG, CS and FP, previous studies 
have explored governance and performance within charities (for example, see, Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; 
Berger et al., 1997; Gomez et al., 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Viviani, 2008; Padron et al., 2005; Ranti, 2013; 
Sheikh & Wang, 2012; Reed et al., 2000). However, the existing literature suffers from a number of limitations. 
First, previous studies have focused mainly on examining the determinants of CG, CS and FP in for-profit 
firms (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; Gomez et al., 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Sheikh  & Wang, 2012). 
Second, despite the theoretical and empirical indications that board gender and ethnic diversity have a 
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significant influence on corporate decisions, including financing (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ntim, 2015), the 
few existing studies examining CS in the not-for-profit sector have largely investigated how general charity 
characteristics, such as size and age, can influence CS (Jegers & Verschueren, 2006; Jegers, 2011). Arguably, 
this limits current understanding of the extent to which TBD can affect CG, CS and FP. Third, the few existing 
studies examining the determinants of CS in not-for-profit organisations have not investigated whether firm-
level CG quality can moderate the association among TBD, CS and FP. 
Fourth, studies examining the association between CS and FP are equally rare; but also have mainly focused 
on private and for-profit sectors. Additionally, the findings of these studies (in private and for-profit sectors) 
are largely mixed (Bandyopadhyay & Barua, 2016; Booth et al., 2001; Chadha & Sharma, 2015; Dawar, 2014; 
Ebaid, 2009; Kester, 1986; Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; 
Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). Another observable limitation 
of these studies is that they do not sufficiently consider the possible moderating effect of board gender/ethnic 
diversity and CG on the association between CS and FP. Finally, despite increasing theoretical/empirical 
suggestions that relying on a multi-theoretical perspective can help in explaining the association between CG, 
CS, and FP (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Ntim, 2015), existing studies are either mainly 
descriptive (Leuz et al., 2010; Titman & Trueman, 1986) or informed by single theoretical perspective (Berger 
et al., 1997; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Myers, 1984). Together, these limitations arguably impede our ability to 
understand and explain the impact of TBD on charity CG, CS and FP. 
Consequently, the current research seeks to address some of the weaknesses of prior research in various 
ways, and thereby extend, as well as offer a couple of new contributions to the prior literature. First, we aim 
to contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact of TBD on CS in SMEs with specific focus on 
UK charities. Second, it contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on why and how charity-level 
CG quality can moderate the association between TBD and CS. Third, the study contributes to existing 
research by investigating the effect of CS on FP of charities. Finally, given that TBD, CG mechanisms and 
CS may act either as complements and/or substitutes, we contribute to existing literature by investigating 
whether TBD and CG quality can moderate the association between charity CS and FP. 
The remainder of this study is organised in the following order. Section 2 outlines the TBD, CG and CS 
issues in UK charities. Sections 3 and 4 review the theoretical and empirical literature, respectively. The 
research design is presented in section 5. The empirical findings are discussed in section 6, whilst section 7 
offers a conclusion to the paper. 
2. TBD, CG, CS and regulatory environment of the UK charity sector  
The need to improve CG practices in the UK gained strong momentum in the late 1980s as this period was 
characterised by low transparency, lack of accountability, weak CG structures and poor financial management 
(Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Palmer & Randall, 2002). Consequently and since the early 1990s, several 
legislations and reports have been introduced aimed at promoting high standards of CG by enhancing 
accountability and transparency among UK charities. In 1993, the Charities Act was issued and sought to 
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strengthen the crucial issue of reporting and financial management. Articles 43 and 45 of the 1993 Charities 
Act require all registered charities with gross annual income exceeding £10,000 or total expenditure exceeding 
£250,000 to prepare annual reports/accounts and submit them to charity commissioners within ten months of 
the year end. These annual reports/accounts should be professionally audited or independently examined. The 
annual reports/accounts shall fairly present the financial position of a charity and should be kept for at least 
six years of the relevant year end. This can be useful to different groups of stakeholders (e.g., government and 
other donors) in assessing trustees’ management and stewardship of funds (Charity Commission and the Office 
of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2014). The Charities Act was updated in 2006 and 2011 with the aim of 
enhancing the independence and objectivity of trustees. For example, Article 80 of 2011 Charities Act suggests 
that the Charity Commission has the right to remove any trustee who has been adjudged to be bankrupt. In 
addition, Articles 36 and 185 of the 2006 and 2011 Charities Acts, respectively, indicate that trustees should 
be paid sufficiently in order to attract, retain and encourage them to perform their activities effectively. 
In addition to the above recommendations, UK charities are required to comply with CG codes, including 
‘The 2008 Hallmarks of an Effective Charity Guidance’ and the ‘2010 Good Governance Charity Code’. In 
relation to the ‘2008 Hallmarks Guidance’, it was published by the Charities Commission and it has six 
principles, including those relating to trustee board structure and risk management (Charity Commission, 
2008). The Hallmarks recommends that charities should be run by a strong board of trustees, which should act 
in the charity’s best interests, including those of donors and beneficiaries. The guidance fails to indicate the 
exact number of trustees that a board should consist of, but suggests that every board must be of sufficient size 
to perform its activities effectively. With regard to trustee board gender and ethnic diversity, the Hallmarks 
suggests that trustee boards should be sufficiently diverse in several aspects (e.g., age, ethnicity, experience, 
gender, qualifications and skills) in order to improve the effectiveness of the board. Additionally, the 
Hallmarks guidance suggests that charities should review/assess all risks faced by them regularly and plan for 
management of those risks. However, and unlike for profit-companies, the guidance does not require charities 
to have a risk register or establish a separate risk committee. Similarly, the Hallmarks did not provide specific 
guidance relating to maintaining a specific optimal CS, but it recommends charities to implement policies that 
will be aimed at managing their debts, investments and reserves in order to maintain long-term sustainable 
operations. 
In addition to the 2008 Hallmarks Guidance, the Charity Commission issued a specific CG Code for the 
charity sector in 2005, known as “Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector”. This 
Code was revised in 2010 with the aim of promoting high standards of CG by enhancing accountability and 
transparency in UK charities. The 2010 CG Code sets out best practices for good governance by providing six 
principles that broadly mirror those contained in the 2010 Hallmarks Guidance. Similar to the Hallmarks, the 
2010 CG Code suggests that trustee boards should be sufficient in size in order to perform their duties and 
activities effectively. The Code also emphasises that charities should review/assess all major risks regularly 
and should also have in place appropriate policies to manage those risks. Unlike the Hallmarks, however, the 
2010 CG Code indicates that it is the duty of trustees to pursue sound financial management and maintain 
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adequate internal control systems, including complying with all applicable general or specific sector 
regulations and laws. The Code also recommends that trustees should hold regular meetings in order to perform 
their activities effectively. Additionally, the 2010 CG Code promotes trustee diversity by recommending that 
board of trustees should have appropriate mix of skills, experience, gender and ethnicity, in order to avoid 
tokenism and be effective.  
3. Charity TBD, CG, CS and FP theories 
Although corporate and academic interest in CG, CS and FP has increased in recent years (Dawar, 2014; 
Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015), there is no comprehensive theoretical framework that can explain the relationship 
among TBD, CG, CS and FP (Calabrese, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; Myers, 2001; 
Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). One way of addressing this limitation is to adopt a multi-
theoretical framework (Parker, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), and therefore this study draws from insights 
provided by agency, legitimacy, stakeholder, resource dependence, pecking order and signalling theories in 
conducting our analysis.  
For example and briefly, agency theory argues that trustees as agents in charities are typically 
opportunistic and thus, do not always act in the best interests of principals (donors) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In this setting, increased leverage usage and the associated capital and interest repayments can be a useful way 
in reducing the divergence of interests between trustees and providers of fund, and that may improve charity 
FP (Jiraporn et al., 2012). However, the usefulness of agency theory in explaining CS has been suggested to 
be impaired because it assumes that managers (trustees) always behave opportunistically, but this is often 
contested because trustees working in charities are often motivated (at least partly) by some level of altruistic 
behaviour than by financial incentives alone (Thomsen, 2014; Elghuweel et al., 2017). 
Resource dependence theory suggests that boards provide an essential link between a charity and the 
powerful stakeholders who provide critical resources needed to be successful (Loukil & Yousfi, 2015; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978; Ntim, 2016). This theory has also been criticised for suggesting that CG practices should be 
pursued in order to mainly advance the strategic interests of organisations (i.e., obtain fund and maximise 
profit), and thus fails to recognise the need for organisations to be accountable and responsible to a broader 
range of stakeholders (Barton & Gordon, 1987; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006).  
Legitimacy theory indicates that there is a communal agreement between an organisation and the wider 
society. Hence, the organisation gains its right to exist from the broader society. Consequently, the goals, 
norms and aspirations of the organisations should be aligned with those of the wider society (Patten, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). However, legitimacy theory is hindered by a number of weaknesses, including its failure to 
determine the identity of the specific stakeholders of charities, and often prioritising financial stakeholders, 
who are clearly not the main beneficiaries of charitable causes (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
Additionally, stakeholder theory presents a charity as consisting of a nexus of explicit and implicit 
contracts among stakeholders, with each group providing the charity with the critical resources required, and 
in exchange, expect their interests to be satisfied (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Elmagrhi et al., 2016, 2017). For 
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example, donors provide charities with finance and they require their funds to be used only for the purposes 
for which they have been given. Stakeholder theory has, however, been criticised for its failure to outline how 
to align the often conflicting interests of different groups of stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995; Sternberg, 1997). 
With respect to CS, pecking order theory suggests that organisations generally prefer internal to external 
sources of finance (Gomez et al., 2016; Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In this case, external sources, 
such as debt will be used only if internal sources have been exhausted. Therefore, according to pecking order 
theory, organisations which are profitable and generate sufficient cash flows are less likely to use debt in their 
CS because they will be able to finance their activities using internal funds. Finally, signalling theory suggests 
that outsiders (i.e., providers of finance) may rely on an organisation external actions’ in order to minimise 
information asymmetry problems. In particular, signalling theory assumes that the CS of a charity may act as 
a signal to outsiders about the organisation’s future financial prospects (Michaelas et al., 1999; Ross, 1977). 
Thus, a charity’s decision to issue more debt may be perceived by outsiders as a signal by trustees that their 
charity may have bright future prospects.  
 As there are clear limitations with respect to each individual theoretical perspective and given that this 
study seeks to examine four related issues (i.e., the impact of TBD on CS; the moderating effect of CG quality 
on the TBD-CS nexus; the relationship between CS and FP; and the moderating effect of TBD and CG quality 
on the CS-FP nexus), this study adopts a multi-theoretical approach. 
4. Charity TBD, CG, CS and FP: Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
4.1 Charity TBD and CS 
TBD has been suggested to play an important function in terms of alleviating different types of agency 
problems and ensuring that organisations operate efficiently and competitively (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017). In particular, it has been suggested that TBD (gender and 
ethnic diversity) can perform a vital role in enhancing board effectiveness by increasing board independence 
from management and also by bringing diverse ideas, perspectives, knowledge and experience to the board 
(Buse et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Das & Dey, 2016; Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2015). 
Additionally, Delis et al. (2016), Gyapong et al. (2016) and Ntim (2015) argue that organisations with more 
women and ethnic minorities on their boards may be better place to improve FP by monitoring managers more 
closely. This implies that charities with gender/ethnically diverse boards may not need to employ higher levels 
of leverage in order to monitor and encourage trustees to act in line with stakeholders’ interests. Further, and 
from legitimisation perspective, board diversity can enhance organisation’s reputation/image by increasing 
public accountability and confidence (Loukil & Yousfi, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Sila et al., 2016; 
Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). In contrast, TBD can increase managers’ power and influence over board decisions 
by appointing a few women and ethnic minorities mainly for symbolic reasons (Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; 
Gyapong et al., 2016). In this case, charities with a token gender/ethnic representation may need to use more 
debt in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour of managers that may arise from potential poor managerial 
monitoring.  
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Existing empirical studies examining the effect of TBD on CS are rare and therefore, offer opportunities 
to make original contribution to the extant literature. However, prior studies suggest that TBD (gender and 
ethnic diversity) impacts positively on FP (e.g., Borghesi et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Delis et al., 2016; 
Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015), voluntary CG disclosure (Al-
Bassam et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Abdulrahman et al., 2017; Elamer et al., 2017), audit quality (Gul 
et al., 2008), board monitoring (Triana et al., 2013), board meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), dividend payout 
(Byoun et al., 2013), risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013) and social responsibility (Barako & Brown, 2008; 
Brammer et al., 2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Haque & Ntim, 2017), but negatively on executive pay 
(Gregory‐Smith et al. 2014; Newton, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015, 2017; Perryman et al., 2016) and earnings 
management (Elghuweel et al., 2017). Observably, none of these studies relate to the charity sector and 
therefore, highlighting the lack of evidence. However, and to the extent that firms with more diverse boards 
have higher FP, but lower executive pay than firms with less diverse boards, we expect charities with diverse 
boards to monitor managers more closely and therefore, a limited use of debt as external governance 
mechanism. Within the European charity context in general, and UK in particular, there is a strong public 
policy commitment to improve charity governance by positively encouraging greater participation of women 
and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups in senior management teams. In particular, principle 3 
of the 2010 Code of Good Governance for the Sector recommends that that trustee boards should be sufficiently 
diverse in a number of aspects, such as age, gender, faith, qualifications and ethnicity, in order to improve 
board effectiveness (Charity Commission, 2010), and thus TBD can be viewed as a positive development. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1. There is a negative association between TBD and CS. 
4.2 The moderating effect of CG quality on the TBD-CS nexus 
As explained earlier, TBD may improve board monitoring and board independence by bringing different 
perspectives, skills, experience and ideas to the board (Carter et al., 2003; Triana et al., 2013), which can 
improve decisions relating to CS. However, the ability of trustees to perform their role effectively (i.e., 
optimising CS) may be contingent on the quality of CG (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012). 
For example, larger boards are often associated with diversity in gender, age, ethnicity, knowledge and skills. 
This can help improve board independence, and thereby have a positive effect on CS (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 
2011; Berger et al., 1997). By contrast, others (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) suggest that increased 
communication, co-ordination and free-riding problems usually associated with larger boards imply that they 
are more likely to be controlled by powerful managers. Thus, in firms with larger boards, higher levels of 
leverage may be employed as an extra governance mechanism aimed at aligning the interest of agents and 
principals (Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; Jensen, 1986). Similarly, stronger managerial monitoring often 
associated with frequent board meetings can enhance managerial monitoring (Vafeas, 1999), and hence impact 
positively on CS. By contrast, regular board meetings may reduce the amount of time that directors (trustees) 
may have to perform their duties effectively (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992), and that can impact negatively on 
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organisation CS. Additionally, charities with separate CG committees are more likely to use less debt compared 
with their counterparts that do not establish a separate compliance and risk committee. This is because strong 
governance associated with having independent CG committees (Ntim et al., 2012a, b) may act as a substitute 
for external managerial monitoring arising from debt usage. Finally, firms audited by large audit firms (e.g., 
Big-4) are expected to be associated with less agency and information asymmetry problems (DeAngelo, 1981), 
and thus a reduced incentive for managers to use debt because of higher agency costs associated with debt 
(Myers, 1984). In contrast, hiring large audit firms can signal to the stakeholders (i.e., donors) that managers 
are committed to high levels of good governance and transparency (Titman & Trueman, 1986) and that may 
encourage funders to provide more finance in the form of debt to charities. Empirically, there is an acute lack 
of studies examining the moderating effect of CG on the TBD-CS nexus generally, but specifically in not-for-
profit organisations, and thus this study seeks to contribute to the extant literature by examining such an 
association, for the first time, in the charity sector. Given that CG structure can moderate the association 
between trustee board diversity and CS, our second hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
H2. CG quality moderates the association between TBD and CS, with the association being stronger 
(weaker) in charities with strong (weak) CG mechanisms. 
4.3 Charity CS and FP link 
The separation of ownership from control creates agency problems, since agents (trustees) may have 
different interests from those of principals (stakeholders) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Nasr & Ntim, 2017). 
Agency theory suggests that the use of leverage in CS can help in mitigating agency costs by aligning the 
interests of agents with those of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), which can impact 
positively on FP (Dawar, 2014; Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). Similarly, signalling theory suggests that using 
more debt in CS may signal to outsiders (i.e., donors) that a charity has bright future financial prospects, which 
can also improve charity’s FP. In contrast, pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) suggests 
that charities, which are profitable and generate sufficient cash flows, are less likely to use debt in their CS 
because they will prefer using relatively cheaper internal sources of funds (i.e., retained earnings). 
Consequently, negative link could be predicted between debt usage and charity’s FP. 
The findings of extensive prior studies on the association between CS and FP are generally conflicting 
(Bandyopadhyay & Barua, 2016; Booth et al., 2001; Chadha & Sharma, 2015; Dawar, 2014; Ebaid, 2009; 
Kester, 1986; Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Phillips & 
Sipahioglu, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). Noticeably, these studies have been 
conducted exclusively within for-profit contexts, and therefore offer genuine opportunities to contribute to the 
not-for-profit sector. For instance, and in line with the results of prior research (Booth et al., 2001; Dawar, 
2014; Kester, 1986; Sheikh & Wang, 2013; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), Chadha and Sharma (2015) report a 
negative association between CS and FP using a sample of 442 Indian listed firms. By contrast, Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007), and Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) find a positive association between CS and FP. Some prior 
studies, however, report no significant link between CS and FP (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; Krishnan & 
Moyer, 2007; Ebaid, 2009). A major limitation of prior studies examining the association between CS and FP 
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is that they mainly control for general firm characteristics (i.e., firm age and growth) without controlling for 
CG mechanisms that may influence the CS-FP nexus. Thus, we seek to extend the literature further by taking 
into account a comprehensive number of CG variables (e.g., trustee board size and trustee board meeting) 
when examining the relationship between CS and FP. Notwithstanding the mixed findings of past studies on 
the CS-FP nexus, however, our third hypothesis to be tested is that: 
H3. There is a positive association between CS and FP.  
4.4 The moderating effect of TBD and CG quality on the CS-FP nexus 
As previously explained, prior empirical studies have focused on examining the direct link between CS 
and FP. However, the ability of firms with optimal CS to maximise FP may be contingent on CG quality and 
TBD. TBD, for example, may enhance charity FP by providing better linkages with the external environment 
(Delis et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, TBD may increase conflict among board members 
(Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Jackson et al., 2003) and that can impact negatively on the ability of boards to make 
optimal decisions regarding CS and thus charity’s FP.  
CG quality may also moderate the link between charity CS and FP. For example, larger boards may enjoy 
more diversity in skills, experience and knowledge compared with smaller boards, and that may enhance their 
capacity to monitor managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In contrast, larger boards 
are associated with more communication and coordination problems (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Yermack, 
1996), which can impact negatively on FP. The presence of CG committees can enhance charity accountability 
and legitimacy by increasing managerial monitoring and ensuring compliance with good CG practices 
(Harrison, 1987; Ntim et al., 2012 a, b), and thereby impact positively on FP. Also and on the one hand, regular 
attendance of board meetings is considered to be a sign of a diligent trustee (Conger et al., 1998; Sonnenfeld, 
2002), and thus, frequent board meeting can enhance charity FP. On the other hand, frequent meetings may 
impact negatively on FP, because it can increase agency costs in the form of travelling and meetings costs 
(Vafeas, 1999). Finally, the use of large audit firms can signal managerial commitment to good governance 
and transparency (DeAngelo, 1981; Titman & Trueman, 1986), which can impact positively on charity’s FP. 
Empirically, existing studies have not examined the moderating effect of CG and TBD on the association 
between CS and FP (even within for-profit firms), and thus, our study aims to extend, as well as contribute to 
the extant literature by examining the moderating effect of TBD and CG quality on the CS-FP nexus in the 
charity sector. Given that CG quality and TBD may moderate the relationship between CS and charities’ FP, 
the last hypothesis is: 
H4: TBD/CG quality moderates the association between CS and FP, with the association being stronger 
(weaker) in charities with more (less) women/ethnic trustees on the board. 
5. Research design  
 
5.1 Sample selection and data sources 
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Three criteria were set to select the final sample: (i) the annual published accounts of the selected charities 
needed to be available/accessible for the years from 2010 to 2014; (ii) a charity’s financial and CG data must 
be available for all years from 2010 to 2014; and (iii) availability of CS data for years from 2010 to 2014. A 
number of reasons encouraged the use of these criteria. First, this study limits its sample to charities with 
consecutive-years data available, because CG, financial and CS data were manually collected, which is well 
documented to be a highly labour intensive activity (Ntim et al., 2013). Second, and in line with past studies 
(Newton, 2015; Ntim, 2015; Rosen & Sappington, 2016), these criteria helped to satisfy the requirement of a 
balanced panel analysis. Third, combining time-series and cross-sectional data helps in determining whether 
any observed cross-sectional relationship among TBD, CG mechanisms, CS, and FP also holds over time. 
Further, by combining time series and cross-sectional properties, balanced panel data has the ability to increase 
the degrees of freedom and thus reduce econometric and statistical problems, such as multi-collinearities 
among the variables employed. Fourth, the financial year of 2010 was the first year when data collection started 
because in this year the Code of Good Governance for Voluntary and Community Sector was issued. The 
financial year of 2014 is the last year for which data was available to be collected from the data sources. 
[Insert Table 1] 
The study is based on the biggest 100 registered UK charities using total annual income as at 31 March 
2014. Charities have been classified based on the classification provided by the Charities Aid Foundation to 
include five categories: (i) disability; (ii) health; (iii) education; (iv) poverty; and (v) others (see Table 1). Due 
to collecting the data manually, which is considered as a highly labour intensive activity, coupled with the 
extensive nature of TBD, CG, CS, and financial data required, we restricted our final balanced sample to 50 
charities from 2010 to 2014 (i.e., resulting in a sample of 250 observations). Indeed, Table 1 shows the 
characteristics of 30 of the charities studied in terms of their (i) name, (ii) type of charity, (iii) total income, 
(iv) total assets, (v) total debt and (vi) capital expenditure. We collected our data manually from the annual 
published accounts of the examined sample. Those annual accounts were downloaded from charities websites 
and FAME database. 
 
5.2 Definition of variables and model specification 
Table 2 summarises all the main types of variables used in conducting our empirical analyses. To test H1 
(i.e., to answer our first central research question: the effect of TBD on CS), we use three main types of 
variables. First, and following prior studies (Calabrese, 2011; Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 
2012), the ratios of long-term debt, short-term debt and total debt to total assets are our main dependent 
variables (CS). Second, our main independent variables are trustee board gender (TGD) and ethnic (TED) 
diversity and they are measured following prior studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014) using: (i) the 
percentage of women/ethnic minorities on the trustee board; and (ii) a dichotomous variable of presence (1) or 
absence of (0) of women and ethnic minorities on charity boards. Finally, and in order to address possible 
omitted variables bias (Gujarati 2003), we added a number of control variables that may affect CS. In 
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particular, we controlled for CG mechanisms (i.e., board size, audit firm size, the CG committee, and board 
meetings) and charity characteristics (i.e., liquidity, capital expenditure, industry and year dummies). 
Assuming that all the hypothesised associations are linear, our base ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
           itit
i
iitit CONTSTBDCS   

8
1
10                                                         (1) 
Where: CS is the main dependent variable; TBD is our main independent trustee board gender/ethnic 
diversity variable; and CONTS refers to control variables, including trustee board size (TSE), audit firm size 
(AFS), the presence of independent CG committee (PCGC), and frequency of trustee board meetings (TMs). 
[Insert Table 2] 
To test H2 (i.e., to answer our supplementary research question: whether CG quality can moderate the 
association between TBD and CS), we divide study’s variables into four groups. First, our main dependent 
variable is total debt (TD) and is broadly defined to include both long-term (LTD) and short-term (STD) debt. 
Second, our main independent variable is trustee board gender/ethnic diversity (TBD). Third, and to test for 
the moderating impact of CG quality on the TBD-CS nexus, we generate an interaction variable between each 
CG quality mechanism and TBD (TBD*TSE, TBD*AFS, TBD*PCGC, and TBD*TMs). Finally, we control for 
the same variables employed in Model 1. 
To test H3 (i.e., to answer our second central research question: the effect of CS on charity FP) we use 
three main types of variables. First, we classify our variables into three main groups. First, our main 
independent variable (CS) is total debt (TD) and is broadly defined to include both long-term (LTD) and short-
term (STD) debt. Second, our main dependent variable is charity FP, as measured by return on assets (ROA). 
Finally, we control for the same variables employed in the first and second models. Assuming that all the 
associations are linear, the econometric model to specifically test H3 is structured as follows: 
itit
i
iitit CONTSCSROA   

8
1
10                                                                     (2) 
To test H4 (i.e., to answer our supplementary research question: whether TBD and CG quality can 
moderate the CS-FP nexus), we divide study’s variables into four groups. First, our main dependent variable 
(FP) is return on assets (ROA). Second, our main independent variable (CS) is total debt (TD). Third, and to 
test for the moderating impact of TBD and CG quality on the CS-FP nexus, we create an interaction variable 
among firm-level CG quality, TBD and TD (e.g., TD*TBD, TD*TSE, TD*AFS, and TD*PCGC). Finally, we 
control for the same variables utilised previously in Model 2. 
6. Empirical findings 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation analyses 
Table 3 reports the summary descriptive statistics of our main dependent, independent and control 
variables over the period investigated (2010-2014), respectively. Overall, the Table shows wide spread for all 
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variables under examination. For example, and consistent with Calabrese (2011), and Sheikh and Wang (2012), 
total debt (TD) ranges from 96.10% to 1.10% with a mean of 30.27%. The mean of trustee board gender 
diversity (TGD) indicates that 30.07% of all trustees are women, implying that UK trustee boards are 
dominated by men (70%). Similarly, the mean of trustee board ethnic diversity (TED) indicates that only 4.24% 
of all trustees are non-whites, suggesting that, on average, the boards of sampled UK charities are dominated 
by white trustees (96%), who are mainly white men (70%). In relation to return on assets (ROA), it ranges 
between a minimum of -34.29% to a maximum of 97.72%, with a mean of 61.67%, implying that the average 
UK trustee is profitable (i.e., have surplus). The mean value of trustee board size (TSE) is 13.69 members, 
ranging from 5 to 30 members. Trustee board meetings (TMs) ranges between a minimum of 2 meetings to a 
maximum of 14 annual meetings, with a mean of 5.13 annual board meetings. With respect to the other 
remaining variables, including AFS, PCGC, LIQ and CEX, all show wide variation, indicating that there is 
adequate variation in our variables. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for all independent, dependent and control variables included in 
our regression analysis in order to identify any potential multicollinearity problems. As a robustness check, we 
report both the parametric and non-parametric coefficients for Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients, respectively. Observably, the direction and of both coefficients are essentially the same; 
suggesting that any remaining normality problems may not be statistically harmful. Additionally, both the 
Pearson and Spearman coefficients indicate that the levels of correlation among all variables are somewhat 
low, suggesting that there are no serious multicollinearity problems among the variables included in our study. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 (focusing on Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients) shows statistically strong links among 
TD, TBD and ROA. For example, the evidence that return on assets (ROA) is positively and significantly 
associated with TD is consistent with our predictions and the findings of Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) and 
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) for publicly listed firms. 
 
6.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
 
6.2.1 The empirical findings of the effect of TBD on CS 
First, to answer our first research question (i.e.,  the effect of TBD on CS), Table 5 presents the empirical 
findings of the impact of trustee board gender (TGD)/ethnic (TED) diversity on CS. Specifically, the table 
contains results relating to the effect of TGD and TED on long-term (LTD), short-term (STD) and total debt 
(TD), respectively. Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5 suggest that TGD is negatively associated with CS, and 
thereby providing empirical support for H1. The negative TGD-CS nexus is consistent with the prediction that 
gender-diverse boards may provide better monitoring over management by bringing diverse ideas, 
perspectives, knowledge and experience to the board (Buse et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Estelyi & Nisar, 
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2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2016; Triana et al., 2013), which impact negatively on the charity debt level (CS). 
Empirically, the negative link between TGD and CS is empirically supportive of the results of previous studies 
(e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015), 
which suggest that gender-diverse boards are associated with better monitoring over management, and thereby 
reducing agency problems that are often associated with managers having access to large free cash flows.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Models 5 to 7 of Table 5 also indicate that TED is insignificantly associated with short-term and total 
debt, which does not lend support to H1. Evidence of insignificant influence of TED in the UK charity 
boardrooms is largely consistent with their extremely low representation (4.24%, see Table 3), suggesting that 
ethnic minorities have less influence over boards’ decisions, including CS (Carter et al., 2010). This also offers 
empirical support for the predictions of token status theory, which suggests charities may appoint a few ethnic 
minorities to their boards simply for symbolic reasons (i.e., representing disadvantaged groups) rather than for 
substantive ones (e.g., seeking their views in major charity decisions). Model 5 of Table 5 also suggests that 
TED is positively and significantly associated with CS, implying that H1 is not empirically supported. The 
evidence is consistent with the expectations that ethnic diversity can increase managers’ power and influence 
over board decisions by appointing few ethnic minorities mainly for symbolic reasons (Gyapong et al., 2016). 
Second, to answer our second research question (i.e., the moderating effect of CG quality on the TBD-CS 
nexus), the empirical findings relating to investigating the potential moderating effect of CG quality (i.e. TSE, 
AFS, PCGC and TMs) on the TBD-CS nexus are presented in Table 5. In particular, Models 4 and 8 of Table 
5 report results relating to the moderating effect of CG quality on the relationships among trustee board gender 
diversity (TGD), ethnic diversity (TED) and total debt (TD). All control variables included in Models 1-3 and 
5-7 are included in Models 4 and 8 of Table 5. The coefficient of TGD on TD in Model 4 is negative and 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of TED on TD is statistically significant and positive. Crucially, 
it is clearly observable from our results that the TBD-CS nexus has noticeably improved. The result suggests 
that CG significantly moderates the TBD-CS nexus. For instance, the link between TED and TD has improved 
from 0.131 in Model 7 of Table 5 to 3.866 in Model 8 of the same Table. The results, therefore, provide 
empirical support for H2 that CG quality moderates the association between TBD and CS, with the association 
being stronger in charities with good CG practices. 
 
With respect to the interaction variables, the evidence reported in Models 4 and 8 of Table 5 generally 
provide evidence of a moderating effect of CG quality on the association between TBD and TD, which is 
largely consistent with our hypotheses. To be specific, the statistically positive effect of TGD*TSE, TGD*AFS 
and TGD*TMs on TD in Model 4 is empirically supportive of H2, whereas the statistically insignificant effect 
of TGD*PCGC on TD in Model 4 does not provide support to H2. The insignificant effect of PCGC on the 
association between TGD and TD may not be surprising, because only 28% of the sampled charities have a 
separate independent CG committee, and thus resulting in small cross-sectional variations of the PCGC among 
the examined charities. Additionally, the coefficient of TED*TSE on TD in Model 8 of Table 5 is statistically 
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significant and negative providing support for the prediction that larger boards are associated with greater 
diversity in knowledge, experience and skills, and that may help reduce information asymmetry by improving 
board independence, and thus impact negatively on CS (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; Berger et al., 1997). 
However, the statistically insignificant effect of TED*AFS, TED*PCGC and TED*TMs on TD in Model 8 of 
Table 5 does not provide support for H2. Overall, the evidence is that the interacted variables (CG quality) 
have helped in improving the magnitude of TD and this is an indication that CG quality has a moderating effect 
on the link between TBD and CS, with the association being stronger in charities with good CG practices. 
6.2.2 The empirical findings of the effect of charity CS on FP 
Third, to answer our third research question (i.e., the effect of CS on FP), the empirical findings of the CS 
along with the control variables on charity FP are reported in Table 6. In particular, Table 6 contains the results 
for three models relating to LTD (Model 1), STD (Model 2) and TD (Model 3). The results generally suggest 
that CS (LTD, STD and TD) is positively and significantly linked with charity FP (ROA), implying that H3 is 
empirically supported. The positive effect of CS on charity FP is consistent with the prediction that the use of 
leverage in CS can help in mitigating agency costs by aligning the interests of agents (trustees) with those of 
principals (donors) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), and thereby having a positive impact on FP 
(Dawar, 2014; Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). Additionally, using more debt in CS may signal to outsiders (i.e., 
funders) that a charity has bright future financial prospects and that can improve charity’s FP. Empirically, our 
evidence offers support for the results of past research (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Margaritis & Psillaki, 
2010), which also reported a positive and significant association between CS and FP, albeit in for-profit firms.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Finally, to answer our fourth research question (i.e., the moderating effect of TBD and CG quality on the 
CS-FP nexus), the empirical findings relating to investigating the potential moderating effect of TBD and CG 
quality (i.e., TSE, AFS, PCGC and TMs) on the CS-FP nexus are reported in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6. All 
control variables included in Models 1 to 3 are included in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6. The coefficients of TD 
on ROA in Models 4 and 5 are, respectively, positive and statistically significant. Crucially, it is clearly 
observable from our results presented in Models 4 and 5 that the CS-FP nexus has noticeably improved, 
implying that TBD and CG quality moderate the association between CS and charity FP. For example, the link 
between TD and ROA has increased from 0.962 in Model 3 to 1.709 in Model 4 of Table 6. Similarly, the link 
between TD and ROA has increased from 0.962 in Model 3 to 1.732 in Model 5 of Table 6. The result indicates 
that TBD and CG significantly moderates the association between CS and charity FP, with the association 
being stronger in charities with diverse boards and good CG practices. 
With respect to the interaction variables, the results provided in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6 generally 
provide evidence of a moderating effect of CG structure and TBD on the association between CS and FP, which 
is largely consistent with our predictions. For example, the coefficients of TD*TSE and TD*AFS on ROA in 
Model 4 of Table 6 are statistically significant, providing support for H4. However, the coefficients of 
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TD*TGD, TD*PCGC and TD*TMs on ROA in Model 4 of Table 6 are statistically insignificant, which does 
not provide support for H4. Similarly, the statistically significant and negative effect of TD*TED, TD*TSE 
and TD*AFS on ROA in Model 5 of Table 6 provides support for H4, whereas the statistically insignificant 
effect of TD*PCGC and TD*TMs on ROA in Model 5 of Table 6 does not provide support for H4. Overall, the 
interacted variables seem to have helped towards improving the magnitude of the coefficients and this suggests 
that diverse trustee boards and strong CG structures moderate the association between CS and FP, with the 
association being stronger in charities with diverse trustee boards and good CG practices. 
6.3 Additional Analysis 
Recent global debate and public policy, especially in the EU, UK and Scandinavian countries have sought 
to positively improve the representation of women and BAME groups on corporate boards (e.g., Gyapong et 
al., 2016). However, whilst it is ethically, morally and socially appropriate to include more women and ethnic 
minorities on corporate boards, such affirmative action measures can arguably be sustainable if their presence 
also improves board decision-making and FP. There is, however, no theoretical or empirical evidence on what 
is the optimal number of women and BAME groups that should be represented on charity boards. For example, 
the EU sets a 25% target of women directors for all large listed firms, whilst the target is 50% in Norway.   
Therefore, we seek to inform public debate by examining whether increasing the number of women and ethnic 
minority (e.g., from 1 to 7 or more) trustees affects CS. To answer this question, we adopt the critical mass 
theory and token status theory (Gyapong et al., 2016; Kanter, 1977; Schwab et al., 2016). These two theories 
suggest that gender and ethnic diversity may have a significant effect on board’s decisions when there is a 
critical mass. We follow Gyapong et al. (2016), Liu et al. (2014) and Schwab et al. (2016) and create seven 
dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board gender/ethnic diversity. We replaced “TGD and TED” 
in Models 3 and 7 of Table 5 with our women/ethnic minority trustee dummies (D1_TG/ED to D7_TG/ED) 
(i.e., with average trustee board size of 13 members, 7 women on a board is the critical point at which the 
average board of trustees in our sample will be clearly dominated by women (i.e., women are in the majority). 
In relation to TGD, the results presented in Models 1 to 7 of Table 7 suggest that increasing the number of 
women trustees to a certain level has a significant effect on CS. Specifically, the results indicate that trustee 
boards with one, two and three women (D1_TGD, D2_TGD and D3_TGD) are associated with significantly 
low debt usage. However, the decrease in TD is lower in trustee boards with four or more women. This implies 
that increasing the number of women on trustee board to a certain point (up to 3, which represents about 25% 
of board members) may enhance board decision. However, having four or more women on trustee boards 
appears to increase conflicts among board members, which may impact negatively on boardroom decision-
making, CS and FP. 
[Insert Table 7] 
[Insert Table 8] 
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To further investigate the impact of increasing the number of women on CS and following Delis et al. 
(2016), our sample is divided into two groups: (i) charities with high percentage of women (charities having a 
TGD value higher than the mean value); and (ii) charities with low percentage of women (charities having a 
TGD value lower than the mean value). The results are reported in Table 8 under columns 9 and 10. Overall, 
the results suggest that charities with less gender diversity tend to use lower levels of debt compared to those 
with more gender diverse boards, a finding which is largely consistent with indications of our critical mass and 
token status theories and analyses. In relation to TED, the results presented in Models 1 to 7 of Table 7 suggest 
that there is no association between increasing the number of non-white trustees on charities boards. The 
insignificant effect of TED (D1_TED to D7_TED) on CS may be due to their extremely low representation 
(4.24%, see Table 3) and this suggests that ethnic minorities have less influence over boards’ decisions, 
including CS, evidence which is again largely consistent with predictions of token status theory. Due to the 
insignificant effect TED (D1_TED to D7_TED) on CS, we have not divided our sample into charities with low 
and high percentage of non-white trustees.  
6.4 Robustness Analysis  
  We carried out several additional tests to check the robustness of our results. With reference to the effect 
of TBD on CS, we run four different tests: (i) lagged structure models; (ii) fixed-effects; (iii) two-stage least 
square (2SLS); and (iv) Heckman selection model. First, to control for potential endogeneities that may arise 
from simultaneous associations between TBD and CS, a lagged effect model has been estimated, whereby this 
year’s CS is influenced by past year’s TBD and control variables. The findings reported in Columns 2 and 3 
of Table 9 suggest that the findings are fairly robust to possible endogeneity issues that might emerge from 
simultaneous relationship between TBD and CS. Second, we seek to address concerns that CS might be 
influenced by unobserved charity-level characteristics. Models 3 and 7 of Table 5 are re-estimated by including 
dummies that represent the examined charities and the results are reported in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 9. 
Overall, the results remain generally the same, suggesting that our results are not affected by endogeneity 
problems that may be associated with unobserved charity-level characteristics.  
[Insert Table 9] 
Third, to address concerns associated with possible omitted variable bias and following past studies 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003, 2010), a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) was conducted to investigate 
whether there is any endogenous link between TBD and CS. We re-estimated Models 3 and 7 of Table 5 using 
DWH and the test fails to accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, indicating that the 2SLS may be more 
appropriate than OLS regression. In the first stage, TBD is expected to be influenced by the eight control 
variables. In stage two, the predicted values of TBD is used as instrument to re-estimate our models. Overall, 
after comparing the results of 2SLS with the main OLS results, the findings reported in Column 6 and 7 of 
Table 9 remain relatively similar to those reported previously in Table 5, indicating that the findings of the 
study remained fairly robust to using 2SLS. 
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Fourth and according to Gyapong et al. (2016), self-selection bias may be introduced into a study like this 
in a number of ways. For example, qualified women and BAME trustees are generally in short supply. This 
means that the few qualified women and BAME trustees will have the option to join the boards of charities of 
their choice, and thereby resulting in a situation whereby qualified women and BAME trustees self-select 
themselves to join boards of charities with good CG practices and higher performance. Similarly, some 
charities may choose (e.g., for ethical, financial, moral and social reasons) to deliberately pursue a policy of 
appointing more women and BAME trustees, and thereby making their presence on the boards of their charities 
a non-random occurrence. Further and as previously explained, by restricting our sample only to charities with 
the full five-year data required, survivorship biased can be introduced, and thereby potentially biasing the 
sample selection process. The availability of any of these conditions may introduce self-selection bias into our 
regression analyses, and consequently impact negatively on the reliability of our findings. 
As a result and following prior studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Hoechle et al., 2012; Peel & Makepeace, 
2012), we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to address potential self-selection bias that may be 
inherent in our findings. In stage one of Heckman model, we employed dummies as dependent variables 
(D_TGD and D_TED) to analyse the decision to appoint (1) or not to appoint (0) a female/ethnic minority 
trustee. We identify independent variable that may influence charities’ decision to appoint or not to appoint 
women/ethnic minority trustees. Previous studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Hillman et al., 2007) suggest that 
charities in industries with many women/ethnic minority trustees are expected to appoint more women/ethnic 
minority trustees. We, therefore, use women/ethnic minority ratio (TGD_Ratio and TED_Ratio) as a factor 
that may influence charities’ decision to appoint women/ethnic monitory trustees. We follow Gyapong et al. 
(2016) and Liu et al. (2014) and measure women and ethnic minority ratio as the total number of women/non-
white trustees in an industry minus the total number of women/non-white trustees in that charity, all divided 
by the total number of trustees in that industry minus the total number of trustees in that charity. We employ 
TGD_Ratio and TED_Ratio as determinants of charities’ decision to appoint or not to appoint a women/ethnic 
minority trustee in the first stage of Heckman model. We also include all the control variables included in our 
previous models.  
In the second stage, we calculate Lambda and include it in our regression model to control for self-
selection bias. The results reported in Models 8 and 10 of Table 10 indicate that Lambda (for both gender and 
ethnicity) has a positive and significant coefficient. However, trustee board gender diversity (TGD) remains 
positive and significantly related to TD, whereas trustee ethnic diversity (TED) still shows a positive and 
insignificant association with TD even after controlling for sample selection bias.     
In terms of the association between CS and charity FP, three different robustness tests have been 
conducted: (i) lagged-effects; (ii) fixed-effects; and (iii) 2SLS. First, to address endogeneity concerns that may 
arise from simultaneous associations between CS and charity FP, a lagged effect model has been estimated, 
whereby this year’s FP is influenced by the past year’s CS and control measures. The findings reported in 
Model 1 of Table 10 remain relatively similar to those reported previously in Table 5, indicating that the 
findings of the study remained fairly robust using lagged structure model. Second, this study also attempts to 
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control for concerns that CS might be influenced by unobserved charity-level hetereoscedasticity by estimating 
fixed-effects model. We re-estimated Model 3 in Table 5 by including dummies to represent sampled charities 
and the results are reported in Column 3 of Table 10. Overall, the results indicate that total debt is significant 
and positively linked with FP (ROA), and thereby suggesting that our results are not affected by endogeneity 
problems that may be associated with unobserved charity-level characteristics. 
[Insert Table 10] 
Finally, to control for endogeneities that may be associated with potential omitted variables bias, we re-
estimated Model 3 of Table 5 using the 2SLS methodology. Following the same procedures adopted in Models 
5 and 6 of Table 8, we first conducted the DWH test, to investigate whether there is any endogenous link 
between ROA and TD. DWH test fails to accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, indicating that the 2SLS 
may be more appropriate than OLS regression. The findings reported in Model 3 of Table 10 remain relatively 
similar to those reported in Table 5, and therefore indicating that the results of the current study remain largely 
unaffected by problems associated with potential omitted variables bias. 
7. Summary and conclusion  
This study examines whether trustee board diversity (TBD) impacts on capital structure (CS), and 
consequently ascertains whether CG can moderate this association. Additionally, we examine the effect of CS 
on charity performance (FP), and consequently examine the potential moderating influence of TBD and CG 
quality on the association between CS and charity FP throughout the period from 2010 to 2014. Our study 
extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the current literature. First, we extend and 
contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact of TBD on CS. There is an acute dearth of prior 
research that has investigated the impact of TBD on CS in the charity sector. The findings indicate that charities 
with gender-diverse boards tend to use less debt. However, we also find that trustee board ethnic diversity is 
positively and significantly associated with long-term debt and insignificantly associated with short-term and 
total debt.  
Second, this study extends, as well as contributes to existing literature by investigating the moderating 
effect of CG quality on the association between TBD and CS. We find that the association between TBD and 
CS has significantly improved, suggesting that charity-level CG quality appears to moderate this association. 
Third, we contribute to extant literature by examining the relationship between CS and FP in charity sector. 
Our results indicate that CS (including long-term, short-term and total debt) has a positive and significant 
association with charity FP, measured by ROA. Fourth, this study extends, as well as contributes to the extant 
literature by examining the potential moderating effect of TBD and CG on the association between CS and 
charity FP. Overall, and consistent with our expectations, we find that the association between CS and FP 
improves considerably in charities with gender/ethnically diverse boards and good CG structures.  
Fifth, our study contributes to the extant literature by examining whether increasing the number of women 
and ethnic minority trustees affect CS. We find that increasing the number of women on trustee board to a 
certain point (up to 3, which represent about 25% of board members of the average charity included in our 
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sample) enhances board decision-making. However, having four or more women on the board of trustees can 
increase conflicts among board members, which may reduce the influence of women in the boardroom, which 
is largely in line with the predictions of critical mass and token status theories. Similarly, the study finds no 
association between the level of trustee board ethnic diversity and CS. Sixth, despite increasing theoretical 
suggestions that adopting a multi-theoretical framework can help in explaining the varied reasons determining 
the choice of CS and the impact of CS on FP, existing studies are either descriptive or informed by single 
theories. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature by offering new insights from agency, resource 
dependence, stakeholder, legitimacy, pecking order and signalling theories to explain the impact of TBD on 
CS, as well as the effect of CS on charity FP. 
Seventh, the findings of our studies have important implications for charities and stakeholders. With 
reference to charities, the evidence suggests that TBD have a substantial influence on CS. This implies that 
charities may need to pay close attention to this mechanism in order to align the interests of agents (trustees) 
and principals (donors). In terms of stakeholders, the evidence suggests that CS has a significant impact on 
charity FP; hence stakeholders may use CS as indicator when providing finance to charities. Eighth, the 
evidence provided in this paper provides potential empirical and theoretical insights for further future studies. 
In terms of empirical expansions, this paper focused only on the UK, and thus future research can extend our 
study by examining the associations of interests (i.e., questions 1 to 4) in different international governance 
environments (i.e., developing or developed countries). With respect to the theoretical expansions, our 
evidence indicate that future studies may improve their theoretical grounds by using other theories, such as 
stewardship theory, when examining the impact of TBD on CS and also to ascertain whether charity FP is 
influenced by CS. Finally, although the results of this study are robust to alternative estimations and models, 
our study has some limitations, including restricting our analysis to TBD. As data becomes available, future 
studies may consider the impact of other factors, including country levels factors (e.g., inflation rate, political 
situation and macro-economic conditions) on CS. In addition, despite its potential strengths, such as increasing 
degrees of freedom and reducing potential multi-collinearities problems, our use of balanced panel data can 
result in other sampling problems, such as survivorship bias, which needs to be taken into account when 
interpreting our results. Also, this study has examined the impact of CS on charity FP without considering the 
impact of CS on other outcomes, including trustees’ pay, hence future studies can extend our study and 
contribute to the extant literature by investigating the impact of CS on trustees’ pay. Further, the current study 
has examined the impact of TBD on CS, and consequently whether charity FP is related to CS, future studies 
can enhance our understanding by conducting in-depth interviews and qualitative analysis to gain further 
insights relating to these associations. 
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Table 1 
Financial Data of 30 Charites for 2010 
Charity Name Charity 
Type 
Total 
Income 
(£000) 
Total 
Assets 
(£000) 
Total 
Debt 
(£000) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(£000) 
 
ActionAid Poverty 65,745 19,065 6,845 1,026 
Arthritis Research UK  Health 36,261 113,488  13,525  24,021 
Autism Initiatives UK Disability 32,246 14,588 5,750 867 
The Charities Aid Foundation Other  377,433 1,854,579 1,074,055 96,096 
Cancer Research UK  Health 514,900 482,100 255,300 77,100 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development Other  49,055 34,827 7,791 7,144 
Cats Protection  Other  34,736 60,836 2,997 7,918 
Church of England Children’s Society Other  40,956 43,168 6,238 9,841 
City and Guilds of London Institute  Education 118,259 102,970 25,291 10,572 
BBC Children in Need Poverty  44,204 83,279 51,873 274,390 
CITB Education  317,448 87,095 54,113 1,095 
Care International UK Poverty  32,509 18,038 6,579 119 
Consumers’ Association Education  70,870 52,748 13,245 21,383 
Crime Reduction Initiatives  Poverty  57,508 20,336 8,760 317 
Dogs Trust Other  60,702 100,862 5,342 17,841 
The Keepers and Governors of the Free 
Grammar  School of John Lyon 
Education  39,957 99,486 22,607 9,217 
Help for Heroes  Other  45,723 56,610 54,404 202 
Historic Royal Palaces  Other  61,792 41,288 9,518 406 
The Royal National Institute for Deaf People Disability  47,258 24,816 3,409 2,308 
International Planned Parenthood Federation Education  87,998 89,006 11,998 466 
SS. John and Elizabeth Charity Health  42,671 41,052 24,270 935 
The Kennedy Trust for Rheumatology Research  Health  62,662 100,921 13,128 2,411 
The Legal Education Foundation  Education  73,113 118,203 24,967 3,393 
Liverpool Hope University Education  52,474 81,746 17,415 12,654 
Learning and Skills Improvement Service Education  147,128 30,298 26,124 720 
The Mines Advisory Group Poverty  31,173 8,847 7,539 1,844 
Macmillan Cancer Support Health  123,394 183,400 113,054 13,406 
The National Autistic Society Disability  88,310 54,743 24,196 3,987 
National Centre for Social Research Education  40,366 21,479 12,264 271 
Nuffield Health  Health  553,100 563,800 293,700 28,200 
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Table 2 
Variables definition and measurement 
Panel A: Capital structure 
LTD Percentage of total long term debt to total assets. 
STD Percentage of total short term debt to total assets. 
TD Percentage of total long and short term debts to total assets. 
Panel B: Trustee board gender diversity 
TGD The proportion of female trustee members to the total number of trustees. 
D_TGD 1 if a charity has at least one woman director on the trustee board, 0 otherwise.  
D1_TGD 1 if a charity has one woman director on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D2_TGD 1 if a charity has two women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D3_TGD 1 if a charity has three women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D4_TGD 1 if a charity has four women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D5_TGD 1 if a charity has five women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D6_TGD 1 if a charity has six women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D7_TGD 1 if a charity has seven or more women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Trustee board ethnic diversity 
TED The proportion of non-white or black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) background trustees to the 
total number of trustees. 
D_TED 1 if a charity has at least one non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background 
trustee, 0 otherwise. 
D1_TED 1 if a charity has one non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustee, 0 
otherwise. 
D2_TED 1 if a charity has two non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D3_TED 1 if a charity has three non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D4_TED 1 if a charity has four non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D5_TED 1 if a charity has five non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D6_TED 1 if a charity has six non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D7_TED 1 if a charity has seven or more non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background 
trustees, 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Charity performance 
ROA Surplus or total funds generated in the financial period divided by total assets. 
Panel E.1: Control variables (governance mechanisms) 
TSE The total number of trustees in a financial year. 
AFS 1 if a charity is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
PCGC 1 if a charity has a separate independent CG committee, 0 otherwise.   
TMs Natural logarithm of the frequency of trustee meetings in a financial year. 
Panel E.2: Control variables (charity characteristics) 
LIQ Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets.  
IDU Dummy variables for each of the main five industries. 
YDU Dummy variables for the years 2010-2014. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capital structure   
LTD (%) 6.64 0.37 10.87 0.04 42.90 
STD (%) 23.63 16.85 20.37 1.10 96.10 
TD (%) 30.27 24.84 21.93 1.10 96.10 
Trustee board diversity 
TGD (%) 30.07 30.77 15.36 0.00 77.80 
TED (%) 4.24 0.00 6.25 0.00 30.00 
Charity performance    
ROA (%) 61.67 66.91 25.91 -34.29 97.72 
Control variables (governance mechanisms)   
TSE (no.) 13.60 12.00 5.17 5.00 30.00 
AFS (%) 40.00 00.00 49.00 00.00 100.00 
PCGC (%) 28.00 00.00 45.00 00.00 100.00 
TMs (no.) 5.13 4.00 1.90 2.00 14.00 
Control variables (charity characteristics)   
LIQ (%) 2.36 1.85 2.34 29.04 0.03 
CEX (%) 10.60 5.68 28.59 -29.57 29.48 
Notes: LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee 
board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee ethnic diversity; ROA denotes return on assets; TSE denotes 
trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the separate independent CG committee; TMs 
denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. Table 2 fully defines 
all the variables used. 
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Table 4 
Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrices 
Variable LTD STD TD TGD TED TSE AFS PCGC TMs LIQ CEX ROA 
LTD  -.072 .329*** .125** .204*** .003 -.076 -.038 -.120* -.338*** -.144** .182*** 
STD -.118* 
 
.867*** -.105* -.103  .197*** .092 -.274*** -.065 -.175*** .121* .778*** 
TD .386*** .870***  -.089 .032 .164*** .079 -.254*** -.123* -.355*** .061 .837*** 
TGD -.080 -.017 -.055  
 
.246*** .151** .046 -.076 .181*** -.188*** -.049 -.165*** 
TED .255*** -.075 .058 .166*** 
 
-.042 .029 .048 -.054 .029 -.258*** .032 
TSE -.042 .234*** .197*** .178*** -.137**  .019 .144** -.133** -.177*** .112* .069 
AFS -.002 .038 .035 .077 .048 .023  -.073 -011 .082 .088 -.096 
PCGC .005 -.194*** -.178*** -.059 .063 .144** -.073  .093 .009 -.037 -.158** 
TMs -.281*** -.014 -.152** .199*** -.071 -.182*** -.101 .070  .099 .106* -.093 
LIQ -.177*** -.228*** -.300*** -.099 .012 -.135** .051 .078 .148**  .099 -.267*** 
CEX -.211*** -.032 -.134** .034 -.140** -.061 .147** -.095 .062 .007  -.025 
ROA .261*** .739*** .816*** -.140** .051 .090 -.072 -.103 -.123* -.238*** -.086  
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficient, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s correlation coefficients. Variables 
are definite as follows: LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee 
ethnic diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; 
LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure; ROA denotes return on assets. ***, ** and * indicate that correlations among variables are significant at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels (2-tailed) respectively 
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Table 5  
Effect of trustee board diversity on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
LTD 
(1) 
STD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
LTD 
(5) 
STD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
TD 
(8) 
Trustee board gender diversity:        
TGD -0.048(.234) -0.149(.074)* -0.196(.022)** -3.095(.000)*** - - - - 
Trustee board ethnic diversity         
TED  - - - - 0.231(.015)** -0.100(.616) 0.131(.523) 3.866(.028)** 
Interaction variables:  Governance*TGD       
TGD*TSE - - - 0.603(.012)** - - - - 
TGD*AFS - - - 0.410(.23)** - - - - 
TGD*PCGC - - - -0.131(.550) - - - - 
TGD*TMs - - - 0.800(.001)*** - - - - 
Interaction variables: Governance*TED        
TED*TSE - - - - - - - -1.615(.002)*** 
TED*AFS - - - - - - - 0.294(.555) 
TED*PCGC - - - - - - - -0.246(.622) 
TED*TMs - - - - - - - 0.040(.949) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms        
TSE -3.019(.065)* 17.282(.000)*** 14.261(.000)*** 0.589(.933) -2.746(.088)* 15.634(.000)*** 12.891(.000)*** 19.822(.000)*** 
AFS 0.633(.595) 2.614(.290) 3.260(.200) -10.685(.081)* 0.284(.809) 2.258(.363) 2.556(.318) 0.613(.844) 
PCGC 0.170(.902) -7.828(.007)*** -7.667(.010)*** -1.686(.811) 0.094(.945) -7.012(.015)** -6.928(.020)** -6.024(.087)* 
TMs -6.930(.000)*** 1.235(.761) -5.717(.172) -26.553(.001)*** -7.172(.000)*** -1.124(.774) -8.313(.041)** -9.209(.045)** 
Controls: Charity characteristics       
LIQ -0.480(.059)* -1.910(.000)*** -2.392(.000)*** -2.528(.000)*** -0.463(.066)* -1.830(.001)*** -2.295(.000)*** -2.568(.000)*** 
CEX -0.084(.000)*** -0.003(.950) -0.087(.048)** -0.100(.022)** -0.076(.000)*** -0.006(.896) -0.082(.069)* -0.070(.117) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 12.704** -72.881*** -60.151*** 9.674*** 9.928*** -69.159*** -59.214*** -75.385 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.646 2.306 2.548 2.589 2.753 2.224 2.452 2.480 
F- value 9.553*** 4.673*** 6.738*** 6.298*** 10.062*** 4.405*** 6.259*** 5.875*** 
Adj. R2 0.345 0.171 0.244 0.277 0.338 0.161 0.228 0.261 
Notes:  LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee board ethnic diversity; 
TG/ED*TSE  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and trustee size;  TG/ED*AFS  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board 
gender/ethnic diversity and audit firm size;  TG/ED*PCGC  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and  existence of a separate independent CG 
committee;  TG/ED*TMs  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and trustee meetings; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC 
denotes the separate compliance, governance or risk committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Effect of  Capital structure on charity performance 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
ROA 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
ROA 
(5) 
Capital structure:      
LTD 0.467(.005)*** - - - - 
STD - 0.919(.000)*** - - - 
TD  - - 0.962(.000)*** 1.709(.000)*** 1.732(.000)*** 
Interaction variables: Governance, TGD, TED and TD    
TD*TGD - - - 0.003(.287) - 
TD*TED - - - - -0.013(.082)* 
TD*TSE - - - -0.304(.021)** -0.268(.031)** 
TD*AFS - - - -0.236(.015)** -0.253(.008)*** 
TD*PCGC - - - 0.039(.733) 0.097(.406) 
TD*TMs - - - -0.008(.958) 0.011(.937) 
Trustee board gender and ethnic diversity    
TGD - - - 0.047(.625) - 
TED - - - - -0.368(.167) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms     
TSE 8.574(.038)** -7.683(.009)*** -5.057(.048)** -12.911(.002)*** -12.259(.001)*** 
AFS -2.985(.324) -4.749(.023)** -5.329(.004)*** -12.873(.000)*** -12.299(.000)*** 
PCGC -1.053(.762) 5.690(.019)** 5.634(.009)***  4.412(.327)  6.350(.156) 
TMs -11.614(.019)** -14.319(.000)*** -6.929(.019)** -5.242(.276) -6.048(.204) 
Controls: Charity characteristics    
LIQ -2.101(.001)*** -0.629(.166) -0.109(.790) -0.039(.926) -0.030(.942) 
CEX 0.011(.842) -0.026(.464) 0.055(.091)* 0.033(.335)  0.031(.367) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 50.636*** 121.844*** 111.978*** 132.669*** 133.559*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.274 2.538 2.469 2.582 2.439 
F- value 4.892*** 29.503*** 41.399*** 30.481*** 30.792*** 
Adj. R2 0.180 0.616 0.694 0.703 0.705 
Notes: ROA denotes return on assets; LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt.  
The next set of six variables is interaction variable among trustee board gender (TGD) and ethnic (TED) diversity, CG 
mechanism and long-term debt, respectively. TG/ED denotes trustee gender and ethnic diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; 
AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee 
meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Effect of trustee board gender diversity (critical mass) on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
High  
(8) 
Low  
(9) 
Trustee board gender diversity:         
TGD - - - - - - - 0.164(.292) -0.852(.001)*** 
D1_TGD -24.832(.000)*** - - - - - - - - 
D2_TGD  - -13.209(.001)*** - - - - - - - 
D3_TGD - - -6.919(.039)** - - - - - - 
D4_TGD - - - -3.552(.230) - - - - - 
D5_TGD - - - - -0.736(.811) - - - - 
D6_TGD - - - - - -0.272(.941) - - - 
D7_TGD - - - - - - 0.434(.916) - - 
Controls: Governance mechanisms         
TSE 19.616(.000)*** 18.046(.000)*** 16.231(.000)*** 14.612(.000)*** 12.950(.001)*** 12.638(.002)*** 12.298(.002)*** 17.562(.001)*** 15.622(.006)*** 
AFS 2.868(.246) 2.514(.315) 3.271(.200) 3.025(.239) 2.726(.288) 2.713(.299) 2.626(.312) 3.665(.211) 4.497(.291) 
PCGC -6.941(.015)** -7.323(.012)** -6.708(.022)** -7.012(.018)** -6.845(.022)** -6.799(.024)** -6.723(.024)** -7.966(.020)** -7.084(.139) 
TMs -3.978(.326) -3.686(.382) -6.217(.135) -7.413(.074)* -8.491(.037)** -8.569(.034)** -8.543(.035)** 8.798(.159) 0.918(.897) 
Controls: Charity characteristics        
LIQ -2.342(.000)*** -2.467(.000)*** -2.293(.000)*** -2.356(.000)*** -2.295(.000)*** -2.290(.010)*** -2.290(.000)*** -5.081(.000)*** -2.145(.002)*** 
CEX -0.085(.047)** -0.084(.054)* -0.081(.067)* -0.088(.049)** -0.088(.051)* -0.087(.052)* -0.086(.054)* -0.109(.006)*** 0.130(.480) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -55.894*** -65.239*** -62.833*** -59.775*** -55.723*** -55.011*** -54.316*** -115.564*** -53.571*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.568 2.548 2.528 2.514 2.477 2.470 2.467 2.415 2.353 
F- value 7.920*** 7.293*** 6.642*** 6.361*** 6.225*** 6.220*** 6.221*** 9.756*** 2.613*** 
Adj. R2 0.280 0.261 0.241 0.232 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.478 0.165 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; D1_TGD to D7_TGD are dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board gender diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effect of trustee board Ethnic diversity (critical mass) on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
Trustee board ethnic diversity:       
D1_TED -0.968(.715) - - - - - - 
D2_TED  - -4.267(.315) - - - - - 
D3_TED - - 2.845(.665) - - - - 
D4_TED - - - -4.008(.663) - - - 
D5_TED - - - - -5.235(.599) - - 
D6_TED - - - - - -5.235(.599) - 
D7_TED - - - - - - -5.235(.599) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms       
TSE 12.557(.000)*** 13.028(.000)*** 12.382(.000)*** 12.810(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 
AFS 2.687(.294) 3.144(.226) 2.568(.317) 3.882(.268) 2.895(.264) 2.895(.264) 2.895(.264) 
PCGC -6.703(.024)** -6.940(.019)** -6.832(.021)** -6.862(.021)** -6.868(.021)** -6.868(.021)** -6.868(.021)** 
TMs -8.783(.032)** -9.011(.027)** -8.134(.051)* -9.101(.032)** -9.220(.030)** -9.220(.030)** -9.220(.030)** 
Controls: Charity characteristics      
LIQ -2.291(.000)*** -2.314(.000)*** -2.243(.000)*** -2.336(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** 
CEX -0.089(.049)** -0.091(.042)** -0.085(.056)* -0.088(.050)** -0.087(.050)** -0.087(.050)** -0.087(.050)** 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -54.202*** -54.716*** -55.117*** -54.739*** -54.766*** -54.766*** -54.766*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.479 2.475 2.470 2.455 2.457 2.457 2.457 
F- value 6.233*** 6.319*** 6.238*** 6.238*** 6.247*** 6.247*** 6.247*** 
Adj. R2 0.227 0.230 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; D1_TED to D7_TED are dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board ethnic 
diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; 
LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9  
Additional analyses relating to the effect of trustee board diversity on capital structure 
 
Lagged-Effects 
 
Fixed-Effects 
 
2SLS 
 
Heckman Selection Model 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
 TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
 TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
 TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
 D_TGD 
(7) 
TD 
(8) 
D_TED 
(9) 
TD 
(10) 
Trustee board diversity             
TGD -0.181(.049)** -  -0.199(.019)** -  -2.734(.004)*** -  - -0.196(.022)** - - 
TED - 0.225(.321)  - 0.236(.199)  - 2.864(.318)  - - - 0.095(.641) 
TGD_Ratio - -  - -  - -  -0.019(.961) - - - 
TED_Ratio - -  - -  - -  - - -2.085(.252) - 
LAMBDA - -  - -  - -  - 2.078(.087)* - 83.967(.018)** 
Controls: Governance mechanisms             
TSE 14.461(.000)*** 13.487 (.000)***  -0.796(.850) -0.946(.824)  49.624(.001)*** 20.758(.028)**  0.286(.000)*** 14.261(.000)*** 0.054(.529) 7.086(.094)* 
AFS 3.010(.275) 2.358(.395)  0.834(.764) 1.315(.638)  -92.749(.000)*** 22.774(.523)  0.008(.775) 3.260(.200) 0.011(.862) 1.440(.576) 
PCGC -7.557(.020)** -6.995(.032)**  -7.197(.013)** 7.473 (.010)**  -22.857(.000)*** -8.502(.129)  -0.007(.821) -7.667(.010)*** 0.059(.412) -11.814(.001)*** 
TMs -7.240(.124) -9.390(.040)**  -10.992(.012)** 11.927(.007)***  44.488(.013)** 0.051(.995)  0.185(.000)*** -5.717(.172) -0.207(.039)** 10.213(.243) 
Controls: Charity characteristics            
LIQ -1.844(.001)*** -1.750(.002)***  -1.194(.000)*** -1.292(.000)***  -2.589(.000)*** -2.765(.001)***  -0.002(.719) -2.392(.000)*** -0.001(.919) -2.336(.000)*** 
CEX -0.089(.045)** 0.081(.072)*  0.043(.208) 0.042(.220)  1.483(.044)** -0.043(.751)  0.000(.928) -0.087(.048)** -0.002(.088)* 0.100(.259) 
YDU YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Constant -55.393*** -56.165***  -51.732*** -60.720***  -112.265*** -113.235**  -0.041(.831) -57.608*** 0.626** -99.995*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 1.737 1.772  2.049 2.000  2.168 2.133  2.025 2.180 0.126 2.186 
F- value 5.923*** 5.611***  36.048*** 35.264***  6.493*** 6.259***  8.994(.000)*** 6.738*** 2.377*** 6.340*** 
Adj. R2 0.243 0.231  0.894 0.892  0.223 0.228  0.310 0.244 0.072 0.243 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee board ethnic diversity; TGD_Ratio denotes women ratio;  TED_Ratio denotes ethnic minorities ratio; LAMBDA examines the effect of self-selection 
bias; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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 Table 10  
Additional analyses relating to the effect of capital structure on financial performance 
 
Lagged-Effects 
 
Fixed-Effects 
 
2SLS 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
ROA 
(1) 
 ROA 
(3) 
 ROA 
(5) 
Capital structure:      
TD  0.803(.000)***  1.037(.000)***  0.809(.019)** 
Controls: Governance mechanisms     
TSE -3.534(.297)  -3.858(.128)  -41.050(.001)*** 
AFS -6.315(.010)***  -4.511(.007)***  -28.032(.000)*** 
PCGC 3.999(.162)  -1.544(.377)   66.488(.000)*** 
TMs -8.145(.042)**  -2.343(.377)  -43.687(.000)*** 
Controls: Charity characteristics    
LIQ 0.039(.939)  -0.203(.263)  3.242(.000)*** 
CEX 0.025(.531)  -0.012(.555)  0.650(.000)*** 
YDU YES  YES  YES 
IDU YES  YES  YES 
Constant 108.547***  111.575***  82.165*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 1.789  2.446  2.085 
F- value 19.761***  140.047***  41.399*** 
Adj. R2 0.551  0.971  0.694 
Notes: ROA denotes return on assets; TD denotes total debt; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; 
TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. P-
values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
